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FROM EVERSONTO ZELMAN: THE ADVENT OF
"TRUE PRIVATE CHOICE" AND THE EROSION OF
THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
Melinda Barker*
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides for
freedom of religion in our country.1 This includes not only the
freedom to exercise our chosen religion, but also the freedom
to refrain from participating in a particular religion or any re-
ligion at all.2 Historically, the United States Supreme Court
has interpreted the First Amendment to preclude the gov-
ernment from disbursing taxpayer funds for the advancement
or indoctrination of religion.3 The majority decision in Zel-
man v. Simmons-HarriO marked a significant turn from
these principles, in that the Court upheld a state program
that provided unrestricted funds to private religious schools,
who were free to use those funds in furtherance of their
stated missions to indoctrinate students in their religion.5
This comment will argue that school voucher programs,
as approved in Zelman, fall outside the permissible bounda-
* Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 44. J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., Lewis and Clark College.
1. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
2. "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one re-
ligion over another." Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. I).
3. "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any reli-
gious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion." Id. at 16.
4. 536 U.S. 639, 643-63 (2002).
5. Id. at 664-67.
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ries of the Establishment Clause. The comment will begin
with a discussion of the historical background of the Estab-
lishment Clause.' It will then summarize the analysis ap-
plied by the Supreme Court to evaluate private school assis-
tance programs,7 beginning with Everson' in 1947 and ending
with Zelman9 in 2002. '0 It will then analyze the Zelman deci-
sion, noting the Supreme Court's errors in interpretation of
prior decisions and its misapplication of previously identified
factors in the evaluation of a private school assistance pro-
gram challenge.1' Finally, this comment will suggest a
method for evaluating private school assistance programs
that respects the principles behind the line of prior Supreme
Court decisions, which preserved the separation of church
and state.
12
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Founding Fathers
To understand the Establishment Clause, one must un-
derstand the intentions of the founding fathers and the con-
cerns of the citizens at the time of its ratification. Many of
the earliest settlers in America were fleeing from European
governments that compelled their citizens to support and at-
tend the churches favored by the government. 3 However, the
aversion of the early settlers to compelled indoctrination in a
government-chosen religion did not prevent state govern-
ments such as Virginia from taxing citizens for the benefit of
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. The term "private school assistance programs" will be used throughout
this comment to encompass the variety of government-funded programs that
have been discussed by the Court over the years. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997) (federally funded remedial instruction); Witters v. Wash.
Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S (1986) (disability rehabilitation services);
Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (tax
deductions and tax credits). The programs have taken many forms, including
tax deductions and credits and various forms of direct and indirect subsidies.
This term will be utilized to refer to all the programs resulting in government
aid to private, and therefore religious, schools as a whole.
8. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9. 536 U.S. 639.
10. See infra Part II.B-D.
11. See infra Parts II.E-III.C.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 9-10.
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selected churches.'4 Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
led the movement to prevent government interference in reli-
gious freedom by fighting against the renewal of the state tax
levied by Virginia in support of the Christian Church.'5 This
movement stood for the popular belief that a government
should not force free men to support any church, and that so-
ciety benefits when the minds of men are free from religious
oppression.'1
After successful lobbying by Jefferson and Madison," the
Virginia legislature passed the Virginia Bill for Religious Lib-
erty, originally written by Thomas Jefferson, which provided
"It]hat no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be
enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or
goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief."'8 The Supreme Court has recognized that
the Establishment Clause was intended to provide the same
protections against intrusion by the government in religious
liberty as the Virginia Bill, because the same men drafted
and promoted both.'9 As recently as 2000, the Supreme Court
has described the purpose of the Establishment Clause: "to
prohibit not only the institution of an official church, but any
government act favoring religion, a particular religion, or for
that matter irreligion.'
20
14. Seeid. at 9-11.
15. Seeid. at 11-13.
16. See id.
17. Madison penned his famous letter "Memorial and Remonstrance" while
lobbying against the Virginia church tax law. See JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS
29-36 (Jack N. Rakove, compiler, Literary Classics of the United States Inc.,
1999). In Everson, Justice Black paraphrased the letter as follows:
[Madison] argued that true religion did not need the support of law;
that no person, either believer or non-believer, should be taxed to sup-
port a religious institution of any kind; that the best interest of society
required that the minds of men always be wholly free; and that cruel
persecutions were the inevitable result of government-established relig-
ions.
330 U.S. at 12.
18. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (quoting 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia 84
(1823)).
19. See id.
20. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 868 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). The
majority in Mitchell upheld a federal funding program disbursing funds to
states to provide instructional supplies and materials to both public and private
schools. Id. at 835-36.
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B. 1947-1971: Strict Separation Between Church and State
The first significant case in which the Supreme Court
addressed a private school assistance program was Everson v.
Board of Education.2 In this case, the Court held constitu-
tional a program that provided direct reimbursement to par-
ents of secondary and primary school children for the costs
incurred in busing their children to school.22 The program
was available for all school children in the state, whether en-
rolled in a public or private school.23 Because the program
applied to all children, the Court held that the program did
not violate the Establishment Clause. 4 The five Justice ma-
jority in Everson reasoned that the busing program resem-
bled a general public benefit, such as police and fire protec-
tion, more than a program designed to provide government
support for religious schools and religious indoctrination.25
The majority carefully pointed out that despite its hold-
ing that this particular program did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause, the Court did not intend in any way to
weaken the strong protections of the Establishment Clause.26
The Court further stated that "[t]he First Amendment has
erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be
kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slight-
est breach."27 In utilizing the words "wall between church and
state" that have been credited to Thomas Jefferson,2" Justice
Black reinforced that the Court was mindful of the ideals of
the founding fathers and would stay true to them.29 The four
dissenting Justices in Everson, however, found that this pro-
gram violated the Establishment Clause and the founding fa-
thers' intentions. ° They emphasized that spending any tax
dollars in support of religious indoctrination unconstitution-
21. Everson, 330 U.S. at 14.
22. Id. at 17.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 17-18.
26. Id. at 18.
27. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
28. The first known use of the phrase "a wall between church and state" has
been traced to Thomas Jefferson in a personal letter written just after the pas-
sage of the First Amendment. See Brad J. Davidson, Balancing Parental
Choice, State Interest, and the Establishment Clause: Constitutional Guidelines
for States'School-Choice Legislation, 33 TEx. TECH L. REV. 435, 450-51 (2002).
29. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-16.
30. Id. at 46-47 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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ally coerced taxpayers to subsidize religious beliefs that they
may not wish to support.3' The dissenting Justices concluded
with a warning that even small steps towards allowing the
government to breach the separation of church and state
could ultimately result in the erosion of our Establishment
Clause rights.3"
Between 1948 and 1968, the Court decided several pri-
vate school assistance cases.33 According to the majority in
Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen,34
these decisions reinforce the notion that the Constitution
prohibits any program that breaches the separation of church
and state.3 Addressing the question of what constitutes a
breach of the separation of church and state, the Court de-
clared: "to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."36
In Allen, the Court applied this constitutional standard
to a New York statute that required local public school dis-
tricts to loan secular textbooks to all students, public or pri-
vate, in grades seven through twelve within their bounda-
ries.3" With a six-vote majority, the Court held that the New
York program did not violate the Establishment Clause. 8
The majority cited several characteristics of the program that
influenced its decision: the program was generally available
to all school children;39 the state owned the books, not the
schools or the children;" no funds or books were furnished di-
rectly to the schools;4' and only secular books were loaned un-
der the program." Based on these factors, the Court found
that the program did not coerce children to participate in re-
ligion and therefore did not advance or inhibit religion. 3 The
31. Id. at 21-22 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 57 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
33. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
34. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
35. Id. at 242-43.
36. Id. at 243 (quoting Ahington, 374 U.S. at 222).
37. Id. at 238.
38. Id. at 248-49.
39. Id. at 243.
40. Alen, 392 U.S. at 243.
41. Id. at 243-44.
42. Id at 244-45.
43. Id. at 243.
2004 533
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
three dissenting Justices in Allen found that providing text-
books for use in sectarian schools clearly violated the separa-
tion of church and state. 4 Justice Black, who wrote the ma-
jority opinion in Everson, argued that providing textbooks to
a religious school "realistically will in some way inevitably
tend to propagate the religious views of the favored sect."4"
He contrasted this with the program in Everson that "merely
provid[ed] a general and nondiscriminatory transportation
service in no way related to substantive religious views and
beliefs."46
C 1971-1983 The New Test on the Block: Lemon v.
Kurtzman
In 1971, the Supreme Court heard Lemon v. Kurtzman,7
which challenged two state statutes providing aid to nonpub-
lic elementary and secondary schools. 8 The first program
provided reimbursement to the schools for expenses such as
textbooks, teachers' salaries, and instructional materials.49
The second program paid a fifteen percent salary supplement
for teachers."0 The Court set forth a new three-prong test,
building upon the Allen standard for determining the consti-
tutionality of private school assistance programs. 5' Taken di-
rectly from Allen, the first two prongs required a secular leg-
islative purpose and a principal or primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.52 The third prong, gleaned
from discussions in several preceding cases, including Allen,53
provided that the statute must not foster excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion. 4 A private school as-
sistance program must satisfy all three prongs of this test to
be upheld by the Court.5 In Lemon, the Court held that the
44. Id. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 252 (Black, J., dissenting).
46. Allen, 392 U.S. at 253 (Black, J., dissenting).
47. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
48. Id. at 606-07.
49. Id. at 609-10.
50. Id. at 607.
51. Id. at 612-13.
52. Id. at 612.
53. See Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248
(1968); see also Walz v. Tax Commission, 379 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding a
property tax exemption for qualified religious organizations).
54. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
55. Id. at 612-13.
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reimbursement program violated the third prong of the test,
in that it would require excessive oversight to ensure the
funds were applied only to secular subjects.56 The salary sup-
plement program violated both the second and third prongs of
the test, because it provided aid directly to church-related
schools and caused excessive entanglement.57 In its decision,
the Court noted that the purpose of the Lemon test was not to
"engage in a legalistic minuet in which precise rules and
forms must govern."58 Although the Court had finally de-
clared a clear statement of the issues relevant to Establish-
ment Clause challenges,59 the Court did not state whether the
test would clarify the status of the law or simply would pro-
vide a new framework for continuing debate.6"
In 1973, the Court had its first opportunity to apply the
Lemon test in Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist.61 In Nyquist, the majority declared un-
constitutional two state programs that provided tuition tax
credits and tuition reimbursement to the parents of private
school children.62 The Court cited several factors leading to
its decision that the programs impermissibly advanced relig-
ion in violation of the second prong of the Lemon test.63 First,
the programs were available only to the parents of private
school students, effectively providing financial support for
private religious schools.64 Second, because the permissible
uses of the aid were unrestricted, the state could not ensure
the schools used the funds only for secular purposes.65 Third,
the program created an incentive to send children to religious
schools in violation of the principal of government neutrality
towards religion.66 The Court also discussed whether disburs-
56. Id. at 619-20.
57. Id. at 620-21.
58. Id. at 614.
59. The Lemon test is still the test most often utilized in other types of Es-
tablishment Clause challenges. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 986-87 (Richard S. Epstein et al. eds., 1997).
60. See Maureen 0. Manion, Churches and States.- The Politics of Accom-
modation, 44 J. OF CHURCH & ST. 317, 319 (2002).
61. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
62. See Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Pivate School
Choice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 37, 57-58 (1993).
63. Id. at 59-60.
64. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783.
65. Id. at 780.
66. Id. at 786.
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ing the aid to the parents, instead of directly to the schools,
cured the Establishment Clause implications of the pro-
grams.67 In declaring that funneling money via a third party,
the parents, did not cure the constitutional defects of the pro-
gram, the Court explained that
[I]f the grants are offered as an incentive to parents to
send their children to sectarian schools by making unre-
stricted cash payments to them, the Establishment Clause
is violated .... Whether the grant is labeled a reim-
bursement, a reward, or a subsidy, its substantive impact
is still the same.68
After Nyquist, the Court heard Meek v. Pittenger,69 which
challenged three Pennsylvania private school assistance pro-
grams. 0 The first program permitted state officials to loan
instructional materials and equipment to all qualified private
schools within the state.7' The Court found this program im-
permissible on the grounds that the total subsidization to pri-
vate schools would cost approximately twelve million dollars,
which "inescapably results in the direct and substantial ad-
vancement of religious activity."72 The second program made
available professional staff and equipment for auxiliary ser-
vices73 for all private schools; however, it only provided aid
upon the request of the private schools' administrations.74
According to the Court, this program did not meet the third
prong of the Lemon test, because it would require too much
oversight to ensure that the schools used these services exclu-
sively for secular purposes, and thus would create excessive
entanglement between government and religion. 5 In contrast
to the first two programs in Meek, the third program, which
provided secular textbooks to all primary and secondary
school children,76 did not violate the Establishment Clause.7
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
70. Id. at 351-55.
71. Id. at 354-55.
72. Id. at 365-66.
73. The auxiliary services provided by the programs include remedial and
accelerated instruction, guidance, counseling, testing, and speech and hearing
therapy services. Id. at 352-53.
74. Id. at 367.
75. Meek, 421 U.S. at 370-73.
76. Id. at 354-55.
77. See id. at 349. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court
536 Vol: 44
EROSION OF CHURCHAND STATE
D. 1983-2001: The Advent of "True Private Choice"
Eight years after the decision in Meek, the Supreme
Court heard Mueller v. Allen."8 Mueller involved a private
school assistance program in Minnesota that provided state
income tax deductions for school expenses, such as tuition,
books, and transportation, incurred by parents of public and
private school children. 9 The Court determined that the pro-
gram satisfied all three prongs of the Lemon test ° and was
therefore constitutional.' Though the program in Mueller
was similar to the program struck down in Nyquist,82 the
Court distinguished the Mueller program because of its avail-
ability to parents of both public and private school children. 3
Based on this factor, the Court found the program to be more
in line with the permissible programs in Everson and Allen
than those in Nyquist.84
The Mueller Court emphasized two factors that had been
mentioned in previous cases, but had never before been the
determinative factors for upholding private school assistance
programs. First, the Court looked at whether the program
was designed to provide aid to all school children without any
reference to religion.85 The Court rejected the argument that
the programs inevitably advanced religion due to the sub-
stantial amount of aid that ultimately ended up in parochial
schools.86 Second, the Court found that by structuring the
and delivered his opinion, which was the opinion of the Court on all of the is-
sues except his finding that the textbook program was unconstitutional. Six
Justices, in a mix of concurring and dissenting opinions, found that the text-
books portion of the program was constitutional. See id.
78. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
79. See id. at 390-91.
80. See id. at 394-403. In finding that this program met the Lemon test, the
Court made the following determinations: the legislature enacted the program
with the secular purpose of defraying the costs of educational expenses for all
parents; id. at 396, the program did not have the primary effect of advancing
sectarian education as the program was available to all parents, whether their
children attended public or private school; id. at 395-402, and the program did
not excessively entangle the state in religion, as no further action or decision-
making was required of state officials once they determined whether a textbook
qualified for a tax deduction, id. at 403.
81. Id. at 391,404.
82. See Green, supra note 62, at 60-6 1.
83. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398.
84. Id. at 393-94.
85. Id. at 397-98.
86. Id. at 400-01.
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program so that the parents receive the aid, such as via tax
deductions, the state had "reduced the Establishment Clause
objections""7 to the program. The Court affirmed the reason-
ing from Nyquist that "'the fact that aid is disbursed to par-
ents rather than to ... schools' is a material consideration in
Establishment Clause analysis, albeit 'only one among many
factors to be considered."'88 However, the Court further stated
that when the aid ends up at parochial schools based on inde-
pendent choices of the parents, "no 'imprimatur of state ap-
proval' can be deemed to have been conferred on any particu-
lar religion, or on religion generally."8
Written by Justice Marshall, the dissent strongly dis-
agreed with the majority's assertion that the programs in Ny-
quist were distinguishable from the program in Mueller." In
Marshall's view, Nyquist had established that "a State may
not support religious education either through direct grants
to parochial schools or through financial aid to parents of pa-
rochial school students"9' and the Court had chosen to break
completely with long-standing Establishment Clause juris-
prudence going back to Everson.
92
Two years after Mueller, the Court heard two new pri-
vate school assistance cases, Grand Rapids v. Bal]' and Agui-
lar v. Felton."4 These cases challenged private school assis-
tance programs that placed publicly funded teachers in
private schools to teach secular classes." The majorities in
both cases invalidated the programs, stating that neither
87. Id. at 399.
88. Id. (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 781 (1973)).
89. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274
(1981)).
90. See id. at 408-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 404 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. The dissent stated:
For the first time, the Court has upheld financial support for religious
schools without any reason at all to assume that the support will be re-
stricted to the secular functions of those schools and will not be used to
support religious instruction. This result is flatly at odds with the fun-
damental principle that a State may provide no financial support
whatsoever to promote religion.
Id. at 416-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
94. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
95. See id. at 406; Ball, 473 U.S. at 375.
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program met all of the Lemon requirements." The two pro-
grams in Baff7 impermissibly advanced religion because al-
lowing public teachers on parochial school grounds would
suggest to the school children that the government endorsed
the religion affiliated with the school. 9 The program in Agui-
lar created excessive entanglement due to the significant gov-
ernment oversight necessary to ensure that the public em-
ployees did not inculcate religion. 99 Thus, at this point, state
programs providing publicly funded teachers to teach on pa-
rochial school grounds were not permissible under the Estab-
lishment Clause. 100
The following year, the Court heard Witters v. Washing-
ton Department of Services for the Blind.'' In Witters, pro-
gram administrators denied assistance to a blind student,
who qualified for vocational assistance from the state, 2 be-
cause he attended a religious school and the program admin-
istrators believed that assisting him would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. 103  Nonetheless, the Court found the
program permissible under the Lemon test."' Justice Mar-
shall took care, however, to clarify that he was not reinforcing
the rationale of the majority in Mueller.°' Instead of citing to
Mueller, he reinforced the main principle in Ball that
[T]he State may not grant aid to a religious school,
96. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414; Ball, 473 U.S. at 397. The program in
Aguilar met the first two prongs of the Lemon test, but impermissibly created
excessive entanglement between church and state, because "assistance is pro-
vided in the form of teachers, ongoing inspection is required to ensure the ab-
sence of a religious message." Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412. The program in Ball
failed the second prong of the Lemon test, as the Court found that employing
sectarian teachers to teach secular subjects ran a "substantial risk of state-
sponsored indoctrination." Ball, 473 U.S. at 387.
97. Titled the "Community Education" program, the first program in Ball
provided part-time instructors. Ball, 473 U.S. at 377. The second program, ti-
tled the "Shared Time" program, provided full-time instructors. Id. at 376.
98. See id. at 389-93.
99. SeeAguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-14.
100. See Maureen E. Cusack, The Constitutionality of School Voucher Pro-
grams: The United States Supreme Court's Chance to Revive or Revise Estab-
lishment Clause Jurisprudence, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 85, 92-93 (1999).
101. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.16.181 (1981) (authorizing assistance, in the
form of special education and/or training, to assist visually handicapped persons
in attaining a level of self-sufficiency) (repealed 1983).
103. Witters, 474 U.S. at 483-84.
104. Id. at 485.
105. See Green, supra note 62, at 64.
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whether cash or in-kind, where the effect of the aid is 'that
of a direct subsidy to the religious school" from the State.
Aid may have that effect even though it takes the form of
aid to students or parents.
1
0
6
The dissenting Justices argued that Mueller, not Ball, was
the controlling authority for this case. 17 Justice Powell, in
particular, argued that a facially neutral program, equally
available to public and private school students, resulted in
government assistance to parochial schools only through the
choices of the parents, and thus the advancement of religion
was attributable to the parents, not the state.0 8
In 1993, the Supreme Court heard Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District.'0 9 In Zobrest, the parents of a deaf
child who qualified for disability benefits under the Individu-
als with Disabilities Act"0. sued after he was denied participa-
tion in a program that would provide him with a sign-
language interpreter at school."' The district denied his re-
quest on the grounds that providing a public interpreter for a
child attending a parochial school would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause."2  In a 5-4 decision1 the majority upheld
the constitutionality of the program,"' interpreting Mueller
and Witters to hold that "government programs that neu-
trally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined
without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Es-
tablishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institu-
tions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit.""' In
his dissent, Justice Blackmun questioned the majority's in-
terpretation of the precedent set by Mueller and Witters, stat-
ing, "the Court never has authorized a public employee to
106. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (quoting Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
394 (1985)).
107. See Green, supra note 62, at 64-65.
108. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 490-91 (Powell, J., concurring).
109. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
110. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-87 (1970)
(amended 1991).
111. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
112. Id.
113. Four of the Justices dissented on the basis that the case should have
been remanded for consideration on other non-constitutional grounds. Ido at 14
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 8.
540 Vol: 44
EROSION OF CHURCHAND STATE
participate directly in religious indoctrination.""6 In Justice
Blackmun's view, the interpreter would be participating in re-
ligious indoctrination by interpreting the content of both reli-
gious and secular classes of the deaf student. 7 After the de-
cision in Zobrest, which raised new questions regarding the
constitutionality of public employees in private schools,"' the
Court granted certiorari to Agostini v. Felton."' The petition-
ers in Agostini argued that due to changes in the law follow-
ing Aguilar v. Felton,12° the decision in Aguilar should be
overruled. 2' The petitioners also claimed entitlement to relief
from the injunction put in place by the Aguilar decision.'22
The 5-4 majority in Agostini acknowledged that "our Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence has changed significantly
since we decided Ball and Aguilar."2 ' The majority concluded
that Witters and Zobrest had parted from the assumption,
inherent in Aguilar and Ball, that placing public employees
on parochial school grounds would inculcate religion or act as
government endorsement of religion affiliated with the
school.'24
The Agostini Court also reworked the standards for
evaluating private school assistance programs, slightly modi-
fying the Lemon test.' The Court eliminated the third prong
as a separate factor for consideration and recast it as one of
three factors to consider in determining whether the program
had the effect of advancing religion. 2' Thus, if a program had
a legitimate state purpose, as all programs designed to raise
the quality of secondary and primary education do,' the
Court then evaluated whether it would 1) result in govern-
ment indoctrination, 2) define its recipients by reference to re-
ligion, or 3) create an excessive entanglement between church
116. Id. at 18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. See Davidson, supra note 28, at 462.
119. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
121. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209.
122. Id. at 208-09.
123. Id. at 236.
124. Id. at 227.
125. See Cusack, supra note 100, at 93; Davidson, supra note 28, at 462-63.
126. See Cusack, supra note 100, at 94.
127. See William G. Frey & Virginia Lynn Hogben, Vouchers, Tuition Tax
Credits, and Scholarship Donation Tax Credits: A Constitutional and Practical
Analysis, 31 STETSON L. REV. 165, 168 (2002).
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and state.'28 The dissenting Justices argued that the result of
the Agostini majority's misinterpretation of Witters and Zo-
brest "is to repudiate the very reasonable line drawn in Agui-
lar and Ball, and to authorize direct state aid to religious in-
stitutions on an unparalleled scale, in violation of the
Establishment Clause's central prohibition against religious
subsidies by the government."'29 With the Agostini decision, a
narrow majority3 ' of the Court confirmed that long-standing
Establishment Clause principles were no longer controlling
and set the stage for even further erosions of the wall be-
tween church and state.1
3
'
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Mitchell v. Helms,'32
which challenged a federal program that provided federal
funding to state agencies for distribution to state programs
designed to assist children in elementary and secondary
schools.'33 Presumably to comply with Establishment Clause
prohibitions, the program placed several restrictions on the
use of the funds, but the state agencies provided funding to
both public and private schools within their states.134 In a 6-3
decision, the Court approved the program, but was not able to
achieve a majority opinion. 13 The plurality expressly rejected
the two main arguments made against the programs: that 1)
direct non-incidental aid to religion is always unconstitu-
tional,3 6 and 2) a provision of aid to religious schools without
restricting its use to sectarian purposes (thus permitting di-
version of the funds to religious indoctrination) is always im-
permissible.' 7 Justice Scalia explained that, rather than de-
ciding on the basis of direct versus indirect aid,' 38 the Court
128. SeeAgostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
129. Id. at 240-41 (Souter, J., dissenting).
130. The majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. The dissenting Justices were Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at 203.
131. See Davidson, supra note 28, at 463-65.
132. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
133. Id. at 801-03.
134. Id. at 802-03.
135. Six Justices took part in the judgment of the Court. No opinion, how-
ever, achieved a majority. Justice Thomas wrote the plurality opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice O'Connor,
who was joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a concurring opinion. Justices Souter
dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. See id. at 793.
136. Id. at 814-20.
137. Id. at 820-25.
138. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 815-16.
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has consistently evaluated the neutrality of the program to
determine whether the government is impermissibly indoc-
trinating religion at the recipient schools.'39 In the plurality's
view, neutrality exists when a program is available to a broad
class of recipients without any reference to religion.4 ' An-
other means of assuring neutrality is to provide funds to the
parents of school children who "only as a result of the genu-
inely independent and private choices of individuals" 4' would
then transfer the funds to their school of choice.'42 Any indoc-
trination that would occur from the government funds is thus
removed from the government and attributed to the par-
ents. 143
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
holding of the plurality that upheld the constitutionality of
the private school assistance program in Mitchell.144 Writing
a separate opinion, she expressed her concern that the
breadth of the statements made by the plurality was im-
proper. 14 She agreed with the dissent that, in effect, the plu-
rality had found that evenhanded neutrality was the sole
relevant factor to constitutionality under the Establishment
Clause. 146  Justice O'Connor disagreed that that neutrality
should be the sole concern, and with the plurality's statement
that divertability of aid was not of constitutional concern to
an evenhanded public aid program. 41 In her opinion, the plu-
rality misconstrued the precedent set by Witters and Zobrest
to permit actual diversion of funds. 4  According to Justice
O'Connor, those programs were upheld on a finding that the
programs offered true private choice to the recipients, not the
permissibility of diversion of government funds.'49 She argued
that an analysis of diversion of funds should be based on Al-
len, which required proof of actual diversion of funds to in-
validate an otherwise permissible program.5 ° If diversion ex-
139. Id. at 809.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 810 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997)).
142. Id. at 810.
143. Id.
144. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 838 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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isted, the Court would strike down the program as unconsti-
tutional due to lack of precedent for "the use of public funds
to finance religious activities.. 5. After her evaluation of the
Mitchell program however, Justice O'Connor found that any
diversion of funds in this program was de minimis, and thus
she concurred with the holding of the plurality.'5
Justice O'Connor also emphasized the potential role of
private choice in the evaluation of private school assistance
programs.'53 She stated that when a government program
gives aid to a student who is free to choose whether to apply
that aid to a religious or non-religious institution, the ad-
vancement of religion that may occur is "wholly dependent on
the student's private decision" and therefore permissible. 1
4
Thus, a neutral program that causes diversion of funds for re-
ligious purposes would not be acceptable, but a program that
allows for aid to religious schools only after the exercise of an
independent choice by the student would be permissible.
In his dissent, Justice Souter argued that "[s]o far the
line drawn has addressed government aid to education ....
There may be no aid supporting a sectarian school's religious
exercise or the discharge of its religious mission."'' He found
several problems with the program, primarily evidence in the
record that its funds were being diverted to religious pur-
poses."' Justice Souter stated that the plurality had "es-
pouse[d] a new conception of neutrality""7 that would act as
its own test of constitutionality and would "eliminate enquiry
151. Id. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector, 515
U.S. 819, 847 (1995)).
152. Id. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 841-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 842 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156. See Martha McCarthy, Preserving the Establishment Clause: One Step
Forward and Two Steps Back, 2001 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 271, 281 (2001).
157. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 869 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter de-
scribed the historical treatment of neutrality by the Court in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, breaking it down into three distinct eras. First, in Ever-
son and Allen "neutrality" meant "an adequate state of balance between gov-
ernment as ally and as adversary to religion." Id. at 879 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Next, "neutrality" was used as a term to describe benefits determined to be non-
religious, regardless of the role of the government in supplying the benefits. Id.
at 879-81 (Souter, J., dissenting). Finally, starting in the 1980s "neutrality"
meant evenhanded, or applicable to both secular and religious recipients. Id. at
881-83 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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into a law's effects."'58 In conclusion, Justice Souter warned
that if the reasoning of the plurality in Mitchell gained a ma-
jority in the Court, the "substantive principle of no aid to reli-
gious mission[s]""' 9 from Everson and Allen would be de-
stroyed.
E. 2001: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris & Accommodation
In 2001, the fragile balance of the Supreme Court in re-
gard to private school assistance programs was tested in Zel-
man v. Simmons-Harris.6 ° Zelman involved a challenge to an
Ohio program that provided to parents either tuition voucher
credit, up to $2250,61 or reimbursement for tutorial services,
up to $360, to augment their children's education at any
school participating in the program.'62 The tuition vouchers
were available to parents of students who attended private
school, and the tutorial reimbursement was available to par-
ents of children attending public school.' The program was
first designed to provide aid to low-income families,'" then to
allow other families within the state to apply for any remain-
ing vouchers.'65 Once a student qualified to receive program
benefits, he or she could choose from any of the schools par-
ticipating in the program. If the student chose a private
school, his or her parents would receive a check that they en-
dorse over to the school of their choice.'66 According to the
court, "[i]n the 1999-2000 school year, fifty-six schools par-
ticipated in the program, forty-six (eighty-two percent) of
which had a religious affiliation".'67 Of the more than 3700
children enrolled in the program that year, ninety-six percent
chose to attend a parochial school. 6 Ohio taxpayers chal-
lenged the program, arguing that the program's effects
impermissibly advanced religion.'
158. Id. at 869 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 877 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
161. Id. at 646.
162. Id. at 697 (Souter, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 646.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646.
167. Id. at 647.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 648.
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In a 5-4 decision, 7° the court held the Ohio program to be
constitutional under the Establishment Clause, 7' because it
offered a true private choice to its recipients. 2 Relying pri-
marily on the decisions in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, the
Court stated "[t]hree times we have confronted Establishment
Clause challenges to neutral government programs that pro-
vide aid directly to a broad class of individuals, who, in turn,
direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of their own
choosing. Three times we have rejected such challenges."'73
Interestingly, the majority, though mentioning the relevance
of neutrality, did not suggest that neutrality could sustain the
program on its own.'74 Instead, the Court focused primarily
on describing the characteristics of a true private choice pro-
gram and explaining why such programs are constitutional. 7 5
Although she represented the fifth vote of the majority
opinion, Justice O'Connor also wrote a concurring opinion in
Zelman, which detailed her reasoning for finding that the
Ohio program offers its recipients a true private choice.' 6 She
argued that parents had many choices of schools available to
them, some of which participated in the tuition/voucher pro-
gram and some of which did not.7 7 In fact, the state also ex-
pended funds through other programs in support of commu-
nity and magnet schools, in which any of the parents could
have chosen to enroll their children.'78 The additional choices
outside the tuition/voucher program were of critical impor-
tance to Justice O'Connor, who argued that the number of
schooling options available in total, not just as part of the
voucher program, should be taken into account when assess-
ing whether parents and students were really able to exercise
true choice.'79 Because of the variety of schools available in
Ohio, Justice O'Connor found that the program in Zelman of-
170. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justices O'Connor and Thomas also wrote con-
curring opinions. Id. at 642.
171. Id. at 644.
172. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653.
173. Id. at 649.
174. See Steven K. Green, The Illusionary Aspect of 'Private Choice" for
Constitutional Analysis, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 549, 560 (2002).
175. See id.
176. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 663-76.
177. Id. at 663-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
179. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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fered a true private choice and therefore was consistent with
the Establishment Clause."' In her concurring opinion, Jus-
tice O'Connor apparently returned to the traditional notion of
the necessity of an investigation into the actual effects of the
program.'8' Likely, Justice O'Connor would not agree with a
purely facial standard, such as the one proposed by the plu-
rality in Mitchell.'8' Thus, Justice O'Connor would uphold a
program of true private choice, but only after determining to
her satisfaction that the state implementing the program ac-
tually offers a true private choice to the participants. 3
In an opinion written by Justice Souter, the dissenting
Justices argued that the majority had completely broken with
long-standing Establishment Clause jurisprudence.' 84 Justice
Souter invoked Everson, in which all nine Justices held "no
tax in any amount.., can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions.., whatever form they may adopt to
teach... religion."18 He argued that the Ohio program was
at odds with the "no aid" principle in Everson,86 and there-
fore, cannot be constitutionally permissible, since Everson
has never been repudiated or reversed.'87 Justice Souter la-
mented the acceptance of formalism over realism that began
with Mueller,'88 which has made substantial amounts of state
funds available to parochial schools.'89 In conclusion, Justice
Souter wrote: "Madison's objection to three pence has simply
been lost in the majority's formalism."'90
180. Id. at 676 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
181. See discussion supra Part II.B-C.
182. See Green, supra note 174, at 560.
183. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 676 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
186. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
187. The "no aid" principle derives from the majority opinion in Everson,
which held that no taxpayer funds, in any form, could permissibly be used to
assist teaching or practicing religion. See id. at 16.
188. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 693-94 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Mueller
Court was the first to mention potential differences between programs that dis-
bursed funds directly to religious schools and those which diverted the funds to
schools via the parents, thus permitting different treatment based not on the
form of the aid, but rather on the substantive effect of the aid. See Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983).
189. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 697-98 (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting). In this quote, Justice Souter referred
back to the original intentions of the founding fathers that no government
and/or taxpayer funds would be spent on the promotion of religion. See discus-
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Where the law may go from this point is uncertain, as the
majority in Zelman was very narrow.' However, the pattern
up to this point is unmistakable. The Court has moved away
from the traditional respect for "the high wall between church
and state"'92 and has slowly gravitated towards greater accep-
tance of public funds in religious schools.'93
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
In recent years, significant social and political pressure
has led to the proposal of many education reform programs,
including voucher programs, in order to increase the quality
of education in our country.' To date, several states have
successfully implemented voucher programs.'9' Although
state-sponsored voucher programs have legitimate purposes,
one of the undisputed goals of voucher programs is to assist
parents in enrolling their children in private schools, because
private schools are generally considered to offer a better qual-
ity education than that of public schools. 9 ' Since many, if not
most, private schools are religiously affiliated, the most sig-
nificant legal objection to these programs derives from the
prohibitions of the First Amendment and the Establishment
Clause. 9 ' Over time, the Supreme Court has struggled to find
a bright-line standard to distinguish permissible education
reform programs from programs that impermissibly advance
sion supra Part II.A.
191. See Bernard James, Education Law Cases, 24 NAT'L L.J., Aug. 5, 2002,
at C7.
192. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
193. See Eugene Barnosky, Increased Tolerance of Religious Activity in Pub-
lic Schools, N.Y. L.J., July 18, 2002, at 4.
194. See Manion, supra note 60, at 317-18.
195. To date Wisconsin, Ohio, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and Vermont
have passed some form of voucher legislation. See Davidson, supra note 28, at
439. Vouchers have been proposed, but rejected either by the legislature or vot-
ers in Texas, California, and Michigan. See id. at 439-40. In addition, nine
other states are currently considering enactment of voucher programs. See
James, supra note 191.
196. See Manion, supra note 60, at 341.
197. Determination of whether government funds may be disbursed to reli-
gious schools depends largely on the interpretation given to historical back-
ground and intentions of the founding fathers. The strict separationist view
does not permit any government spending on religion, while the accommoda-
tionist view permits such spending, but only when the spending does not con-
done endorsement of the religion(s) of the institutions receiving the funds. See
id. at 318-23.
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religion.9 '
In searching for that bright line, the Supreme Court has
been moving towards upholding educational reform pro-
grams, but at the cost of the protections offered by the Estab-
lishment Clause.'99 The Court has stated that its decisions
are the natural progression taken from previous decisions
and that they do not mark a significant break from the past.2 0
However, that assertion is based on a misapplication of the
prior decisions. The cases leading up to Zelman 9' simply do
not support the leap taken by the Court in declaring the Ohio
school voucher program constitutional.
Zelman marks a critical juncture in the development of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The tensions between
Mitchell and Zelman and the differences between the conser-
vative and moderate factions of the Court have left the door
open for two possible analyses for future private school assis-
tance programs. The Court can either return to the more
reasonable and practical methods of analysis used in the past
to evaluate the programs, or it may continue its progression
towards approval of government funded religious education.
IV. ANALYSIS
Over several decades, the Supreme Court has gradually
modified its approach to Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence.2"2 Recently, the Court has made several dramatic
changes in its analysis,"' particularly relating to the issue of
public assistance to religious schools.2 4 Although the Court
has never overruled the basic traditional principles espoused
in Everson,2 0 5 Allen,20 6 and Nyquist, °' the Court has moved
away from the traditional, strict separationist view and has
208now arrived at a more accommodationist view.
198. See James, supra note 191.
199. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
200. See id. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. See discussion supra Part II.B-E.
202. See discussion supra Part II.B-E.
203. See discussion supra Part II.D-E.
204. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649.
205. 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
206. 392 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1968).
207. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
208. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, at 977-83.
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Agostini v. Felton.9 set forth the current test for private
school assistance programs, a modified two-prong test from
the three-prong Lemon test."'° The first prong questions
whether the program has a legitimate state purpose. 21  This
prong is almost always satisfied because one can easily argue
that the program was designed with the legitimate purpose of
improving the quality of education for children.12 The second
prong, whether the program has the effect of advancing or in-
hibiting religion, 1 ' is much more difficult to answer. To re-
solve this question, the Court looks at three main factors: 1)
religious indoctrination, 2) reference to religion, and 3) exces-
sive entanglement.2 4 In the two most recent private school
assistance cases, the Court has focused its inquiry almost ex-
clusively on the issue of religious indoctrination in its discus-
sion and interpretation of the relevant factors in each case.2 1 5
The Court in Zelman found no religious indoctrination in
the Ohio program, despite its finding that the program would
inevitably result in the advancement of religion. 216 The Court
based its decision on its classification of the Zelman program
as one offering true private choice. 21' As such, any advance-
ment of religion resulted from the parents, not from the
state.218 The Court summarized factors of the Ohio program
that lead to its classification as a true private choice program,
which included neutrality with respect to religion, a general
undertaking to provide educational opportunities, application
to a broad class of recipients without reference to religion, en-
couragement of adjacent secular schools to participate, and
lack of financial incentive for parents that would skew en-
rollment towards religious schools.2 9 The Zelman majority's
emphasis on true private choice marks a very different ap-
proach from the evenhanded/neutrality-based approach taken
209. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
210. See discussion supra Part II.D.
211. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002).
212. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983).
213. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648-49.
214. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
215. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809
(2000).
216. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653.
217. Id. at 662.
218. Id. at 652.
219. Id. at 653-54.
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just two years before by the plurality in Mitchell.22  This
rapid change in emphasis is especially remarkable given that
four of the five Justices that constituted the majority in Zel-
man were the same four in the plurality in Mitchell.22'
The Court's new accomodationist analysis encourages
proponents of private school assistance programs.222  Most
likely, proponents of voucher programs are already working
on developing programs, similar to the one in Zelman, that
provide true private choice to a broad class of people without
reference to religion.223 However, no one can be certain how
the Court will treat private school assistance programs, par-
ticularly vouchers, in the future.24  Although the Court
achieved a majority opinion upholding the voucher program
in Zelman, several remaining inconsistencies and obstacles
need to be resolved before true private choice can function re-
221liably as the constitutional band-aid for voucher programs.
A. Application of Precedent to Voucher Programs
In Zelman, the majority relied on the recognition of true
private choice in Mitchell to support application of true pri-
vate choice as the determinative factor of analysis in uphold-
ing the Ohio voucher program.22 ' The Mitchell plurality
structured its opinion on the analysis of three prior cases:
Mueller,227 Witters, 228 and Zobrest.229 On the surface, this pro-
gression may seem logical, as all of these opinions considered
and upheld government programs that resulted in the dis-
bursement of government funds towards religious educa-
tion.2 ' However, certain critical differences between these
programs and voucher programs belie the reliance the Court
220. See Green, supra note 174, at 560.
221. The four Justices are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas. The fifth vote to create a majority in Zelman was Justice
O'Connor, who had filed a concurring opinion in Mitchell. See Barnosky, supra
note 193, at 7.
222. See Manion, supra note 60.
223. See Davidson, supra note 28, at 483-86.
224. See James, supra note 191.
225. See Barnosky, supra note 193.
226. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652-55 (2002).
227. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
228. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
229. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); see Frey &
Hogben, supra note 127, at 175-76.
230. See discussion supra Part II.D.
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placed on the cases as applicable precedent.
A closer inspection of the factors of the programs in Muel-
ler, Witters, and Zobrest that lead to their classification as
true private choice programs reveals three fundamental dif-
ferences from voucher programs.23' First, the programs in
Witters and Zobrest were geared towards a very narrow class
of people.232 In Witters, the state provided vocational aid to a
blind individual who happened to be a student at a religious
school. 33 In Zobrest, the federal government provided a sign-
language interpreter for a deaf child.3 4 In each of these cases
an individual student who qualified for government aid on
the basis of a disability received a very specific type of aid
that could only benefit that child, not the school the child at-
tended.35 In the words of Justice O'Connor, "[wle decided
Witters and Zobrest on the understanding that the aid was
provided directly to the individual student who, in turn, made
the choice of where to put that aid to use.23 6 Voucher pro-
grams, on the other hand, provide funding to a large group of
people to offset general education costs, so that children have
access to different schools and types of education than are
available to them without the voucher.237
The second significant difference between the Zelman
voucher program and the Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest pro-
grams is that these cases did not involve a direct transfer of
funds to religious schools.238 On the contrary, the programs in
Witters and Zobrest provided assistance, not funding, directly
to the disabled children, and the Mueller program allowed
parents a tax deduction to offset prior personal expenditures
on private school tuition. 39 As seen in the Zelman program,
however, vouchers provide funds directly to religious schools
without restriction on whether the funds are spent on sectar-
240ian or secular functions. Once a participant has qualified
231. See Green, supra note 174; Frey & Hogben, supra note 127.
232. SeeAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 251 (1997).
233. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 483.
234. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
235. See id. at 10-11.
236. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 841 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
237. See Frey & Hogben, supra note 127, at 177.
238. See discussion supra Part I.D.
239. See discussion supra Part IID.
240. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 726-27 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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for the voucher program, the parents evaluate their options
and select a school in which to enroll their child. 4' If the cho-
sen school is a private school, the parents sign over a voucher,
like a third party check, to the chosen school administra-
tion.2 4' The school then "cashes in" the voucher and directly
receives a transfer of funds from the state.43 No restrictions
ensure that once a religious school receives voucher funds, it
spends those funds only on secular and/or remedial instruc-
tion.' Religious schools are thus free to use the funds for any
purpose they deem necessary, including functions in the
schools geared towards religious indoctrination.2 45 Although
precedent shows that any direct transfer of funds from the
government to a religious school for the purpose of religious
indoctrination is unconstitutional,24 true private choice now
appears to be an exception to that rule.247
The third difference is that the programs in Witters and
Zobrest did not create any incentive, financial or otherwise,
for students to attend a private religious school instead of a
public school. 248 The parents and students did not receive any
additional benefits or any financial advantage by placing
their children in a religious school, as the child received ex-
actly the same assistance regardless of the school he or she
attended.49 The voucher program in Zelman promoted en-
rollment at private schools in two ways. First, it allowed par-
ents to send their children to private schools that would not
be available to them without the program.5 ° In fact, the pur-
pose of the Zelman program was to enable parents to pull
their children out of the Cleveland public schools and enroll
241. Id. at 646.
242. Id.
243. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office Report, Publicly Funded Programs in
Cleveland and Milwaukee, GAO-01-914 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter GAO Re-
port].
244. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
245. See id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting).
246. According to Justice O'Connor, "[a]lthough 'our cases have permitted
some government funding of secular functions performed by sectarian organiza-
tions,' our decisions 'provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance
religious activities."' Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995)).
247. See Frey & Hogben, supra note 127, at 175-76.
248. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993); Wit-
ters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986).
249. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10; Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
250. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646-47.
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them in private schools, due to the acknowledged deficiencies
of the public schools in that school district.2 51 Second, the
program provided $2250 in assistance if the child attends pri-
vate school, but only $360 in assistance if the child remains at
a public school.252 Not only did those participants who chose
private school receive more assistance, the great majority of
private schools (eighty-two percent) participating in the pro-
gram were religiously affiliated. 2" Thus, the program en-
couraged parents to send their children to religious schools.254
Statistics show that many of the children would not have
attended the schools in which they enrolled without the
voucher program.255 In 2001, Senator Judd Gregg commis-
sioned the General Accounting Office (GAO) to research the
effects of the Ohio program.256 The GAO concluded that "al-
most two out of three families using vouchers to send their
children to religious schools did not embrace the religion of
those schools."2 7  Likely, these children would not receive
their religious educations but for the voucher funds allotted to
them by the government.
In determining the constitutionality of the program in
Zelman, the majority found irrelevant the fact that the major-
ity of schools participating in the program were religious.5
Likewise, the Zelman Court did not find relevant the fact that
almost ninety-seven percent of the recipients attended reli-
gious schools. 259 Despite statistical evidence that enrollment
in secular private school was not a realistic option for the
program participants,260 the majority looked at only two char-
acteristics of the program: the choices offered as a part of the
program, and any reference to religion in the qualifications
for participation, either by the recipients or the participating
schools.2 ' This type of formalism over substance, the pre-
251. Id. at 644-45.
252. Id. at 645-46.
253. See id. at 647.
254. Notedly, out of the 3,765 students who participated in the program,
3,637 (ninety-six percent) attended a religious school, which comprised eighty-
two percent of the options available. See id. at 664.
255. See GAO Report, supra note 244.
256. See id.
257. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 704 (Souter, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 656-57.
259. Id. at 658.
260. Id. at 704-05 (Souter, J., dissenting).
261. Idat 662-63.
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ferred method of analysis of four of the current Supreme
Court Justices, ignores the practical effects of the program.
262
B. Inconsistent Treatment of the Establishment Clause
The Supreme Court's history of inconsistent treatment of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence creates uncertainty re-
garding the constitutionality of vouchers cases. Between
Everson and Zelman the Court has considered several differ-
ent tests, theories, and factors in determining the constitu-
tionality of private school assistance programs. 263 Remarka-
bly, two of the Justices of the Zelman majority have
previously written opinions that directly contradict the hold-
ing in Zelman.2
The most notable inconsistency in private school assis-
tance cases is the rapid reworking of the constitutional stan-
dard in the two years between Mitchell and Zelman. After
Mitchell, the Court had seemed to adopt facial neutrality as
the new and improved test for Establishment Clause cases,2 6 5
but Zelman marked a sharp turn from that view. In Zelman,
the Court discussed facial neutrality as a relevant factor, but
gave it only secondary importance.266 The Zelman Court fo-
cused its attention instead on true private choice. 67 This
switch in focus was most likely due to the interest in achiev-
ing a majority opinion in Zelman with true private choice as
the standard, as opposed to the plurality achieved in Mitchell,
relying upon neutrality.68 What is not certain is whether a
majority of Justices can agree on how to apply private choice
to voucher programs in the future.
In the future, the Court may limit Zelman to its facts.
Considering that four Justices strongly oppose the majority's
new rationale,2 9 no more than five Justices likely would vote
to approve any government program that provides direct aid
262. Id. at 688-89 (Souter, J., dissenting).
263. See discussion supra Part II.B-E.
264. See Derek H. Davis, Mitchell v. Helms and the Modern CulturalAssault
on the Separation of Church and State, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1035, 1043-44 (2002).
265. See id. at 1049.
266. See Green, supra note 174, at 560.
267. Seeid. at 560-61.
268. See id.
269. The four Justices who dissented in both Mitchell and Zelman were Jus-
tices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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to religious schools. Therefore, the direction of future deci-
sions seems to rest on the shoulders of Justice O'Connor.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Mitchell indicates no inter-
est on her part in applying the new sweeping standards sug-
gested by the plurality in Mitchell to her analysis of private
school assistance cases.27° In fact, she rejected the breadth of
the plurality opinion in Mitchell and remarked that the plu-
rality was taking the Court's prior decisions well beyond their
intended meaning.271 Clearly, neutrality will not be the main
basis of analysis in future cases, as many may have thought
after Mitchell.
C. Future Analysis ofPrivate School Assistance Programs
Uncertainty remains about where the Supreme Court
will draw the line when classifying a program as one of true
private choice. A critical factor that could be used to invali-
date programs as violative of the separation of church and
state is statistical evidence that the primary effect of the
funds is support for religious schools. However, for the Zel-
man majority, statistical analysis of the program's effects
alone was not sufficient to invalidate the program,272 because
the program's effects were attributed to the parents, not the
government, and thus the program could be classified as a
program that offers true private choice.7 The critical ques-
tions then become whether a program offers true private
choice, and whether five Justices can agree on one consistent
standard to apply. Within the Zelman majority, the five Jus-
tices took two very different approaches to evaluating the
Ohio program and determining if the program offered true
private choice. In her concurrence in Zelman, Justice
O'Connor analyzed the Ohio program and found it to be a
program that legitimately offered true choice. 74 In her con-
clusion, Justice O'Connor explained that the Ohio program
offered true private choice, based on the options available
through the voucher program itself and through the other
schools that did not participate in the program but were still
270. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
271. Id. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
272. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 658.
273. Id. at 652.
274. Id. at 676 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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available to the parents."' She determined that because par-
ents could easily choose to enroll their children in other
schools, such as charter or magnet schools, those options were
relevant to the character of the program as well.276 Although
the Zelman majority opinion also mentioned the relevance of
the breadth of options available state-wide, it was not a criti-
cal factor to the majority analysis.277 For the four Justices in
the Zelman majority, 278 an in-depth investigation of the scope
of the options available is not required once a determination
is made that the program is facially neutral.279 If Justice
O'Connor's analysis were applied, the current Court likely
would not obtain a majority opinion upholding a voucher pro-
gram unless a variety of secular and sectarian schools were
readily available to the participants. 2" A majority of the
Court 281 does not interpret the relevant precedents, particu-
larly Witters and Zobrest, to mean that direct funding to reli-
gious schools diverting funds to religious indoctrination is
constitutional. It is only by offering true private choice that a
program can qualify for the new exception created in Zel-
man.282 However, even the more restrictive analysis required
by Justice O'Connor ultimately permits government funds to
be disbursed to religious schools for the purpose of teaching
religion.283  The law has now progressed from Everson s "no
aid" principle, to Lemon s framework of analysis for facially
neutral programs, to permitting any private school assistance
program that offers a sufficient number of secular options.
275. Id. at 663-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
276. Id.
277. See id. at 647.
278. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas dis-
cussed the concept of facial neutrality in the plurality opinion in Mitchell as the
key factor in upholding the constitutionality of the federal assistance program.
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-10 (2000).
279. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 658-60.
280. "These cases are different from prior indirect aid cases in part because a
significant portion of the funds appropriated for the voucher program reach re-
ligious schools without restrictions on the use of these funds." Id. at 663
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
281. Five Justices disagreed with this portion of the plurality opinion in
Mitchell: Justice O'Connor in her concurrence and Justice Souter in his dissent,
who was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See Mitchell, 530
U.S. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 889 (Souter, J., dissenting).
282. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 703 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
283. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
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V. PROPOSAL FOR THE FUTURE
Quite likely, the constitutionality of vouchers will be a
significant issue before the Supreme Court in the coming
years. The social pressures to provide a higher quality of
education and to make more school choice options available to
parents are increasing as news of the failures of our public
schools and the poor educational performance of our children
become more and more common.284 As of this writing, at least
nine states have proposed or implemented state voucher pro-
grams,"' and President Bush included a federal voucher pro-
gram as part of his first major education legislation pack-
age.286 When considering these programs, however, we as a
society cannot let our social concerns, as legitimate as they
may be, divert our attention from the purposes behind the
protections of the First Amendment.
In order to serve the needs of educational reform in our
country, while preserving the protections intended by the Es-
tablishment Clause, the Court should look for guidance to the
decisions in Witters and Zobrest, not as the plurality in
Mitchell saw them, but as they were intended at the time.
These cases set forth a more practical definition of private
choice in which the benefits to the institutions selected by the
student were minimal, if any. The Court should approve only
programs that offer aid to individuals without advancing or
indoctrinating religion. Facts and common sense suggest that
providing blank check vouchers to thousands of students to
choose from a group of schools, the great majority of which
are religious, results in indoctrination of religion that would
not occur but for the vouchers.8 Therefore, the Court should
limit approval of private school assistance programs to those
that assist narrow groups of individuals for secular purposes,
but avoid advancing or indoctrinating religion because they
do not provide any benefit to the schools themselves. The
Court needs to move away from any interpretation of the de-
cision in Zelman that would support the constitutionality of
284. See Davidson, supra note 28, at 437-38.
285. See James, supra note 191.
286. See Davidson, supra note 28, at 439. However, the House of Represen-
tatives defeated this legislation in 2001. See Richard W. Garnett, The Right
Questions About School Choice: Education, Religious Freedom, and the Com-
mon Good, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 1281, 1284 (2002).
287. See discussion supra Part II.E.
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such a program.
VI. CONCLUSION
Beginning with Everso' 88 and ending, for the time being,
with Zelman,2 9 the Supreme Court has gone through many
changes over the last five decades in regards to Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence and its application to private
school assistance programs. At this point, the future treat-
ment of this issue is uncertain. What is certain, however, is
that to be true to the meaning and intent of the First
Amendment, private school assistance programs that provide
direct aid to religious schools cannot be permitted. The jour-
ney the Court has taken from prohibiting three pence of gov-
ernment funds to religious schools 9 ° to permitting millions of
dollars spent in one program29' has been paved with good in-
tentions, but it must end soon, or the Establishment Clause
protections, so important to our founding fathers, will vanish.
288. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
289. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
290. Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
291. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
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